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YALE SCHOOL OF LAW ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
Through the earnest efforts of some very loyal alumni of the Law
School, a movement has been started which should be of the greatest
benefit to Yale and to the School. The formation of a Yale School
of Law Alumni Association at the Yale Club in New York early in
December has been closely followed by a campaign for membership
among not only graduates of the School, but also all Yale men in law,
and the response during the first month has been most encouraging.
The JOURNAL has some selfish interest in the campaign, for member-
ship in the association will carry with it a year's subscription, and a
portion of the annual dues will therefore come to our treasury. We
have been running at a deficit, and it is only by an increase in the cir-
culation that we can hope to support ourselves without aid from the
University.
But it is on behalf of the School, and because of the benefits to it,
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rather than on account of our own interest, that we enlist our hearty
good wishes and earnest coperation in this cause. We believe, and
must express our belief, that our School Qffers as fine a legal educa-
tion as any in the country. When the other great schools are crowded
to capacity, we think it most proper that the opportunity at Yale
should be better known, particularly to Yale men. We therefore urge
the support of this association by all Yale men in law. Particularly
do we urge upon the students in the School a realization of their
obligation to their legal alma mater; we ask their co6peration so far
as in them lies at the present time, and not less when they leave the
School for the bar.
PROFIT ON INVESTMENTS AS TAXABLE INCOME
An income tax question of no less importance than that involved
in the stock dividend case has recently been decided by Judge Thomas
of the District Court of the United States for the District of Con-
necticut, and will shortly be passed upon by the Supreme Court.
Brewster v. Walsh, Collector (Dec. I6, 192o) U. S. D. C., D. Conn.,
No. 2133.2 The problem presented is whether appreciation in value of
an investment, realized by sale, is income of the individual investor in
such sense as to be subject to federal taxation. That the federal govern-
ment has been collecting such taxes is known to all; but economists
as well as lawyers have not been agreed as to the validity of them,
and a judicial expression of opinion on the point has been eagerly
awaited. Judge Thomas' decision that such profits are not taxable has
consequently aroused much comment both in financial journals and in
the daily press.
The facts of the case can be stated briefly. Prior to the effective
date of the Sixteenth Amendment s Mr. Brewster, who was not a
trader in securities, had purchased for investment certain bonds. He
sold these bonds in 1916, part of them at exactly their cost price, others
"Eisner v. Macomber (192o) 25z U. S. x8g, 4o Sup. Ct. i89; see articles in
(igo) 29 YAmz LAw JouRNAT, 735; (1920) 33 HARV. L. Rv. 885; (I920) 20
Cot. L. Rv. 536; (1920) I4 AM. PoL. ScL. REv. 635; (ig2o) 5 Burz. NAT. TAX
Assm. 2oi, 208, 247.
*The case is to be taken to the United States Supreme Court. The day after
Judge Thomas' decision, a judgment for the government was rendered on
demurrer by Judge Hand in a case involving the same point Goodrich v.
Edwards (Dec. 17, i920, U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y.) This case has also been
appealed. The question of the taxability of capital increment realized by sale
by a trustee who held securities for life-tenant and remainderman was argued
before the Supreme Court on Jan. Ix, 2922, in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Sinietanka, Oct Term, 192, No. 6o8.
'March 1, 1913. The text of the Sixteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to
any census or enumeration."
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at a slight advance over cost. But in each case the sale price was
considerably more than the market value of the bonds on March I,
1913. Such gains over the market value of March I, 1913, were
assessed as income for the year 1916.- The tax thereon was paid
under protest and suit was brought for its recovery. Judgment was
given for the plaintiff on the ground that such realized increment in
value was not "income" within the meaning of the term as used in
the Sixteenth Amendment, and therefore the tax thereon violated the
constitutional requirement that direct taxes shall be apportioned accord-
ing to population.5
To draw a line between what is capital and what is income is a
task which baffles economists no less than lawyers.6 The Supreme
Court would have saved itself many troublesome questions could it
have left Congress a free hand to make its own definition of income
for purposes of taxation. But such a course has been foreclosed. In
Eisner v. Macomber Mr. Justice Pitney, in discussing the scope of the
Amendment, said :7
"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from Article i of the
Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified
by the Amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it
becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not
'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as
cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form.
Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the mat-
ter. .. ."
With respect to stock dividends and with respect to judges' salaries'
the court has overturned the Congressional definition of taxable income.
It is clear, therefore, that taxes upon profits realized on the sale of
securities cannot stand if the Court shall be of opinion that "according
to truth and substance" such profits are not income.
Increase in value of capital, before it is realized by sale, is con-
"Unquestionably the Rtvenue Act of 1916 (39 Stat. at L. ch. 463, P. 756)
purports to tax such gains. Sec. i (a) lays a tax upon "the entire net income
received in the preceding calendar year from all sources by every individual."
Sec. 2 (a) declares that the net income of a taxable person "shall include gains,
profits and income derived from . . . sales, or dealings in property." Sec. 2 (c)
provides that "for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale
or other disposition of property . . . acquired before March I, 1913, the fair
market price or value of such property as of March 1, 1913, shall be the basis
for determining the amount of such gain derived."
The Revenue Act of 1918, sec. 213 (Act of Feb. 24, 1919) similarly includes
such "gains" as income. Sec. 214 permits the deduction of losses on investments
realized by sale.
'U. S. Const Art. x, sec. 2, clause 3, and sec. 9, clause 4.
'See Some Income Tax Problems (i92o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNA4 735, and
citations in the notes thereto.
'4o Sup. Ct. i89, at 193.
'Evans v. Gore (1920, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 55o; for criticisms of this decision
see (920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75; (ix2o) 6 Am. BAR. Asso. J. 2=2.
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cededly not income.9 So long as an item of property continues in the
same ownership, appreciation in its value is not income to the owner,
but when the owner exchanges the article for another of equal value,
or for money, then such appreciation in value, which had previously
been deemed capital, becomes on the instant income and only so much
of the value as represents the original cost of the article or its value
on March 1, 1913, continues to remain capital-this is the position of
the advocates of the taxability of capital gains. Whatever else may
be said of it, it can scarcely be called logical. 10 Advocates of either
view, however, can find aid and comfort in the language of Supreme
Court opinions.
In a case which arose under the Income Tax Law of 1867, Mr.
Justice Field declared :1
"The question presented is whether the advance in value of the
bonds, during this period of four years, over their cost, realized by
their sale, was subject to taxation as gains, profits, or income of the
plaintiff for the year in which the bonds were sold. .... "
"The mere fact that property has advanced in value between the
date of its acquisition and sale does not authorize the imposition of
the tax on the amount of the advance. Mere advance in value in no
sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income specified by the statute.
It constitutes and can be treated merely as an increase of capital."
Respecting this decision, the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice McKenna,
has recently stated that, "This case has not been since questioned or
modified."1
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Pitney, in the course of his opinion
in Eisner v. Macomber, said :13
"It is said that a stockholder may sell the new shares acquired in
the stock dividend; and so he may, if he can find a buyer. It is
equally true that if he does sell, and in doing so realizes a profit, such
profit, like any other, is income, and so far as it may have arisen since
the Sixteenth Amendment is taxable by Congress without apportion-
ment. The same would be true were he to sell some of his original
shares at a profit."
" In Eisner v. Macomber, supra note i, at p. 193, Mr. Justice Pitney, in discuss-
ing the definition of income, says (italics are his) : "the gain-derived---fromn--
capital, etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital;
not a growth or increment of.value in the investment; but a gain, a profit,
something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from
the capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being "'derived"--that
is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit
and disposal-that is income derived from property."
"For criticism by an economist, see Federal Taxation of Income and Profits,
a paper read before the American Economic Association at its annual meeting,
December 29, ig2o, and shortly to be published in the Am. EcoN. REv. For a
discussion favoring the tax see (1Q2o) 29 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 738-741.
'Gray v. Darlington (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 63, 65 and 66.
'Lynch v. Turrish (i918) 247 U. S. 221, 230, 38 Sup. Ct. 537, 539.
"40 Sup. Ct. i8g, x95,,
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These statements, however, are treated by judge Thomas as dicta'4
which must be confined in their application to traders in stocks, or else
be treated as contradictory to the decision in Gray v. Darlington, and
of inferior authority. Other cases15 relied upon by the government,
wherein it was held that gains realized by sale formed part of the
corporation's income taxable under the Corporation Tax Act of 19o9,
are distinguished because this Act imposed not an income but an
excise tax.'6
The argument against the taxability of realized capital appreciation
finds further support in the construction of the British Income Tax
Act'7 and in cases involving securities held on trust for life-beneficiary
and remainderman.18 As between life tenant and remainderman, it is
clear that capital increment still remains capital after realization by
sale. If an income tax is assessed upon such increment, who is to pay
it? Not the life-tenant, it would seem, for he has not received and
will not receive the increment-unless its reinvestment by the trustee
can be deemed a receipt by the life-tenant; nor the remainderman, for
he has not received it and may never do so. If the trustee is deemed
to have received taxable income, his payment of the tax necessarily
reduces money which he holds solely for investment, that is, as capital.' 9
The tax, if paid, must come out of property which all parties consider,
and are required by law to consider, as capital. With regard to
securities held on trust, therefore, sale for reinvestment should not
be held to sever increment from capital so as to make it income for
purposes of taxation. With respect to profits realized by an indi-
vidual investor, he would be a bold man who would predict, with
assurance, what the Supreme Court decision will be, but it is believed
"It is unofficially reported that in the argument of Merchant? Loan and
Trust Co. v. Smietanka, supra note 2, when this language in the Macomber
opinion was being pressed upon the court, Mr. Justice Pitney stated from the
bench that counsel might consider it as dictum.
"Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. (19x8) 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467; Hays v.
Gauley Mountain Coal Co. (iq98) 247 U. S. i89, 38 Sup. Ct 470; Southern Pac.
Co. v. Lowe (1918) 247 U. S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 540.
"Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (1913) 231 U. S. 399, 404, 34 Sup. Ct
136; Anderson v. Forty-two Broadway Co. (I915) 239 U. S. 69, 36 Sup. Ct 7.
' See Tebrau Rubber Syndicate v. Farmer (igio) 47 Scot. L. R. 86, at 819:
"It is well settled that in such a case the profit is not part of the person's annual
income liable to be assessed for income tax but results from an appreciation of
his capital. No doubt if it is part of his business to deal in land or investments,
any profts which in the course of that business he realizes form part of his
income; . . ."
"Boardman v. Mansfield (i9o7) 79 Conn. 634, 66 Atl. i69; Smith v. Hooper
(i902) 95 Md. 16, 51 Atl. 844; Jordan v. Jordan (i9o6) 192 Mass. 337, 78 N. E.
459; Gibbons v. Mahon (i&go) 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct 1057.
"In Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, referred to in note 2 supra,
appellant's brief contains the argument that, even if capital appreciation
realized by an individual be deemed taxable income, sec. 2 (b) of the Revenue
Act of 1916 cannot properly be construed as intended to impose such a tax upon
a trustee.
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that the judgment in the Brewster Case should be affirmed. 20 As to
those bonds which were sold at cost, it seems particularly difficult to
say that the increment above market value on March I, 1913, is income.
Even if the meaning of "income" in the Amendment be deemed broad
enough to include a realized profit over cost, it is not likely to be
stretched to cover appreciation in value which simply offsets a previous
decrease and actually represents no profit over cost. Judge Thomas
found it unnecessary to pass upon this point because of his broader
holding that realized profit on investments was not taxable income.
Affirmance by the Supreme Court would, of course, destroy a large
source of revenue from income taxes. On the other hand it would
justify the repeal of the provision which permits the deduction of
losses from sale of investments. 2 ' The economic effect of the existing
practice of taxing gains and allowing deduction of losses is undoubtedly
bad. It deters the tax payer from realizing gains, and furnishes an
incentive to realize losses and to withdraw capital from business enter-
prise for the purpose of investment in tax-exempt securities.22 This
is particularly true in the case of taxpayers of large income where
such deduction may effect the rate of surtax. As is well known, it is
common practice to sell investments for the very purpose of realizing
a loss for income tax purposes, and to repurchase immediately the
same securities. It may be doubted, therefore, whether the actual loss
of revenue would be as great as is anticipated, if capital losses as
well as capital gains were both excluded from consideration.
T. W. S.
For discussion of an analogous problem, see McCamic, Appreciation in
Value as Invested Capital under the Excess Profits Lazo (192o) 30 YA.LE LAw
JoURNAL, 239.
' The Income Tax Law of 1913, except in the case of a trader, did not permit
realized investment losses to be deducted from income. See Mente v. Eisner
(i92o, C. C. A. 2d) 266 Fed. I6I, discussed in (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 220.
The Revenue Act of 1916 permitted such losses to be offset only to the extent
of realized investment gains. In effect this treats them as capital losses, for if
they were income losses they should be taken into account in determining "net
income" which the Act purports to tax.
The Revenue Act of 1918, sec. 214, permits the tax payer to offset against his
entire income realized investment losses.
' The ratio decidendi of Evans v. Gore, note 8 supra, makes it certain that
income from state and municipal bonds is tax-exempt. The existence of millions
of dollars of tax-exempt securities is the most vicious feature of our entire
scheme of income taxation. Unfortunately, there seems no way to meet it but
by a constitutional amendment doing away with the necessity for apportionment
in direct taxes-unless the Supreme Court will recant the views expressed in
Evans v. Gore. An unanswerable criticism of that decision may be found in Mr.
Harry Hubbard's article From Whatever Source Derived (1920) 6 AM. B R.
Asso. J. 22o. The economic evils are discussed by Mr. Otto H. Kahn in Two
Years of Faulty Taxration (i92o) 10-32 and Some Suggestions on Tax Revision
(1920) 12-20.
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SUICIDE AS A DEFENSE TN LIFE INSURANCE
At last the unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.' will cease to trouble lawyers
and underwriters and to mislead courts. In Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson and National Life Ins. Co. v. Miller,2 recently
decided by the Supreme Court, the Ritter Case was tacitly repudiated
by that process of casual reference which Mr. justice Holmes uses so
gracefully. No one could complain of the result actually reached in
the Ritter Case; for, as Mr. justice Holmes remarks, "all the circum-
stances gave moral support to the construction of the policy adopted
by the court." The court might well have decided that the policies
involved in that famous case were avoided by the fraudulent conduct
of the insured in taking out insurance in an excessive amount, with
the wrongful intent of bringing the policies to an untimely maturity by
ending his own life, and thus making good his own heavy defalcations
at the expense of the insurance companies.3 But the state of the
record did not permit such a simple disposition of the cause. What
the court actually decided was - that there was no error in the trial
court's instruction to the jury that "There could be no recovery by the
estate of a dead man of the amount of policies of insurance upon his
life if he takes his life designedly, whilst in sound mind." For
upholding this broad statement of the law, the Supreme Court gave
two reasons: (I) In the absence of an express exception of sane
suicide in any contract of life insurance, such an exception is to be
implied; (2) an express provision for payment in case of suicide
while sane would be void as opposed to public policy.
This decision has signally failed to secure the support of the state
courts. Some have refused outright to accept the decision as sound.4
Many others have limited its application to policies payable to the
insured's estate, and therefore held that no such exception could be
implied to defeat the claim of a designated beneficiary other than the
insured's personal representatives.5 It is manifest, however, that such
'(x898) i69 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 300.
'(92o, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 47.
It seems to be universally held that such a fraud will avoid a policy. Campbell
v. Supreme Conclave (igoi) 66 N. J. L. 274, 49 Atl. 550; Parker v. Des Moines
Life Assn. (1899) io8 Iowa, 117, 78 N. W. 826; Supreme Conclave Improved
Order of Heptasophs v. Miles (19o1) 92 Md. 613, 48 Atl. 845; Smith v. National
Benefit Society (18go) x23 N. Y. 85, 25 N. E. 197.
'See Campbell v. Supreme Conclave, supra; Patterson v. Natural Premium
Life Ins. Co. (1898) 100 Wis. 118, 7 N. IV. 98o; Lange v. Royal Highlanders
(9o5) 75 Neb. I88, Io6 N. W. 224, 11o N. W. xiio. ,
Grand Legion v. Beatty (I9O6) 224 Ill. 346, 99 N. E. 565, 8 L R. A. (N. s.)
124, note; Shipman v. Protected Home Circle (1903) 174 N. Y. 398, 67 N. E.
83; Parker v. Des Moines Life Assn., supra note 3; Morris v. State Mut.
Life Assur. Co. (898) 183 Pa. 563, 39 Ati. 52. Recovery in such cases is
allowed to the third party beneficiary on the ground that such beneficiary has
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a limitation of the rule announced in the Ritter Case is indefensible;
and this is recognized by the Supreme Court in Northwester** Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. McCue,6 in which it is properly said with reference co
the analogous implied exception of death by legal execution, that "the
policy is the measure of the rights of everybody under it." If suicide is
a risk not covered by the policy, the rights of the third party beneficiary
claiming under it are no greater than those of the insured's estate.7
Hence all cases allowing recovery to a designated beneficiary virtually
repudiate the Ritter Case.
It is believed that the doctrine of the Ritter Case has been fully
accepted in only one of the American states." Even in Alabama, which
furnished the sole American precedent for the Ritter Case,9 the supreme
court of the state, while still rendering lip service, has virtually repu-
diated it.1o So deep-seated is the revolt against the doctrine that in no
fewer than four states statutes have been passed prohibiting, either
absolutely or with qualifications, the setting up of suicide as a defense in
actions on insurance policies." In Georgia, in spite of a statute of long
standing which declares that sane suicide avoids a life insurance policy.
it has been held that no such public policy is involved as will preclude
the insurer from waiving the benefit of the statute and expressly
contracting to pay in case of the insured's suicide.12
With the authorities in such a state it is not to be wondered
that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit should have
a vested right in the policy which can not be defeated by the sole act of the
insured. In a few cases it is held that the beneficiary named in a mutual
benefit certificate, not having a vested interest in the contract, is subject to the
defense of suicide to the same extent as the personal representative of the
insured. See Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, supra, and Davis v. Supreme
Council Royal Arcanum (I9O7) i95 Mass. 4o2, 81 N. E. 294.
" (1912) 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220.
'Campbell v. Supreme Conclave, supra note 4; Davis v. Supreme Council
Royal Arcanum, supra; Security Life Ins. Co. v. Dillard (915) 117 Va. 401,
84 S. E. 656, Ann. Cas. 1917 D, 1187, note; Hopkins v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1899, C. C. E. D. Pa.) 94 Fed. 729.
'Security Life Insurance Co. v. Dillard, supra. See also Shipman v. Protected
Home Circle, supra note 5.
'Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth (1882) 71 Ala. 436.
0 See the interesting case of M[utual Life Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy (0917) 2Ol Ala.
337, 78 So. 299, L. R. A. 1918 D, 86o, note, determined by a divided court on a
rehearing, reversing a previous opinion.
'Missouri, Rev. St. iog, sec. 6945, construed -in Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. (9o7) 205 U. S. 489, 27 Sup. Ct. 578; Applegate v. Travelers' Ins. Co.(191o) 153 Mo. App. 63, 132 S. W. 2; Colorado, Laws 29o3, ch. 119, declared
constitutional in Head Camp v. Sloss (91o) 49 Colo. 177, 112 Pac. 49, 31 L. R. A.(N. s.) 831, note; North Dakota, Rev. Codes 1905, sec. 6o64, construed in Har-
rington v. MW'. Life Ins. Co. (Igu) 21 N. D. 447, 131 N. W. 246; Texas, Vernon's
Sayles' Arm. Civ. St. 1914, art. 174, discussed in Floyd v. Ill. Bankers' Life
Assn. (917, Tex. Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 6o7.
"'Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Durden (91) 7 Ga. App. 797, 72 S. E. 295.
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thought it advisable to inquire of the Supreme Court as to what rule
of law was applicable to two cases pending before it. In the first of
these cases, Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, the policy
in suit, granted upon the life of one Johnson, and payable to his wife,
contained a provision that "if within two years from the date hereof,
the said insured shall, . . . while sane or insane, die by his own hand,
then, and every such case, this policy shall be void"; while the second,
on the same life and payable to the insured's estate, was silent as to
suicide, but contained the usual clause declaring it to be incontestable
after one year from the date of its issue. Johnson died by his own
hand while sane, more than two years after the policies had been issued.
The court held that the effect of the incontestable clause was the same
as if an express undertaking to pay in case of suicide bad been inserted
in the policy,13 and that the provision above quoted in the first policy
was but "an inverted expression of the same general intent"; that
"both equally mean that suicide of the insured, sane or insane, after
the specified time shall not be a defense." By reaching this conclusion
the court by inference distinguished the Ritter Case, in so far as it rested
upon the doctrine of implied exception, which was declared to be the
real basis of the decision. It only remained to declare in the light of
the Whitfield Case,14 that the question of the validity of an express
undertaking to pay in case of suicide depends on the policy of each
state, and then by one bold and long step, to hold that unless the state
concerned had taken a different attitude, the Court would uphold such
an undertaking. In the absence of any showing as to the policy of the
states concerned in these contracts, or, indeed, as to what states were
concerned, the Court obligingly determined the policy of the unknown
states for them and declared the insurer liable in each case.
The opinion does not expressly overrule the Ritter Case, and it can,
and doubtless will be, argued that it leaves undisturbed the doctrine
established in that case to the effect that there is an implied exception
of death by suicide when sane in every policy which does not, by way
of incontestable clause or otherwise, contain an express provision
concerning suicide. But such arguments will not prevail. It is a
A very different interpretation of a similar incontestable clause was arrived
at in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy, supra note 1o. Here the court assumed
that an express promise to pay in case of death by suicide while sane would be
void as contrary to public policy, but held that it was nevertheless competent for
the insurer to 'waive the defense by inserting the incontestable clause in its
policy. It is generally held that the incontestable clause cuts off the defense
not only when the policy is silent as to suicide, but also when it contains an
express exception of death by self destruction. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Durden,
supra; Goodwin v. Provident Savings Life Ins. Co. (1896) 97 Iowa, 226, 66
N. W. 157; Harrington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note ii; Krebs v. Phila.
Life Ins. Co. (i915) 249 Pa. 330, 95 At. 91; Silliman v. International Ins. C&.
(915) 13 Tenn. 303, 174 S. W. 113; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Payne
(i895, Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. zO63.
14 Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note iI.
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strangely inconclusive opinion to come from the pen of Mr. Justice
Holmes, but it has put an end to the misconceived doctrine of the
Ritter Case.
The opinion in the principal cases makes reference without comment
to Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue,15 in which it was
held that public policy required a similar implied exception of death
by execution upon conviction of crime, and to Burt v. Central Life Ins.
Co., 6 in which the Court refused to allow the admission of evidence
that the insured was innocent of the'crime for which he was executed.
These cases appear to be supported by some respectable English
authority having a very different historical background,'7 but they rest
principally upon the reasoning of the opinion in the Ritter Case, now
so thoroughly discredited. They stand upon a far more infirm founda-
tion than the Ritter Case, and are repugnant to the simplest principles
of common justice, and even common sense. It is to be hoped that
they too may soon be relegated to innocuous desuetude along with the
Ritter Case. W. R, V.
PRESENT DAY LABOR LITIGATION
After disposing of the question as to whether or not a given strike
has a justified object, as discussed in a previous comment,' we are
next confronted by the question as to whether legal methods are
employed in the furtherance of the strike. The strike may be for a
lawful object, yet the means used may be declared illegal. This is
a common occurrence in labor 'litigation and it is well to realize
wherein these two situations differ.
It has previously been shown that practically any concerted action
by the employees against their employers constitutes a prima facie tort
requiring justification. This justification consists in having as the
object of the strike certain ends which the courts have gradually come
to recognize as legitimate, thus creating a privilege to do something
that is prima fade tortious. But there is no prima facie case against
the employee with respect to the means used; if a strike is for a lawful
object, the burden is on the plaintiff to show unlawful means. Thus
either illegal means or an illegal object will give rise to a cause of
action .
2
"(1912) 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220.
(19o2) 187 U. S. 362, a/Sup. Ct. 139.
"Amicable Society v. Bolland (i83o, H. L) 4 Bligh (N€.R.) 194. In Collins
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (19o7) 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542, 14 L. R. A. (N. s.)
356, note, it is clearly shown that at the time of the decision of this case for-
feiture upon conviction of felony was still in force in England. It therefore
affords an unsafe precedent in the United States, where such forfeitures are
unknown.
'COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280.
* Willcutt v. Driscoll (i9o8) 2oo Mass. iio, 85 N. E. 897; Schwarcs v. Inter-
national Union (ig9o, Sup. Ct) 68 Misc. 528, 124 N. Y. Supp. 9%
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The effect of this is important. Where a group of employees
strikes against an employer B, it is very seldom that B can have the
strike restrained because of its object,3 but he is entitled to a remedy
if illegal means are used. Thus trade competition will excuse or
justify a strike, but it will not excuse certain wrongful hostile acts.
Where A strikes against B to obtain shorter hours, B has no cause of
action. But if A pickets B's plant and threatens those seeking employ-
ment from B, the latter is entitled to the aid of the courts. Extend
this situation, so that A, striking against B, by peaceful persuasion
induces C to strike against D to compel D to refrain from dealing with
B. B again has no cause of action against A. But if A compels C by
means of fines or compulsion of some other kind to take such meas-
ures, then B has an action against A because A has used illegal means.
The usual weapons which A uses, in addition to the strike, are
those suggested above-picketing and boycotting 4  Various other
means involving a breach of the peace are also employed, but these are
not in controversy, for their illegality is firmly established. The ques-
tion of picketing is often before the courts and has been much dis-
puted, and as a result we have two opposing lines of authority. The
minority hold picketing to be illegal per se, while the majority hold it
to be legitimate.
The courts which declare picketing illegal per se do so because they
maintain that picketing and intimidation are inseparably bound
together. Were it possible to have "peaceful" picketing, they say, it
would be legal, but this is a thing impossible.
5 The tendency of the
'Lehigh Steel Co. v. Refining Works (192o, N. J. Ch.) xii Ati. 376.
'Boycotting is here classified as a "means" in accordance with the usual legal
analysis of this subject This classification is questioned below, however, as
leading to confusion rather than to clear thinking, and it is there suggested that
a change would be beneficial.
'The following cases illustrate the position of those courts that hold picketing
to be illegal per se. Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Blowers' Assn. (19o7) 72 N. J. Eq.
653, 66 AtI. 953, affirmed in (1Io) 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl. 262, and followed
in Baldwin Co. v. Local No. 56o (ig2o, N. J. Ch.) xo9 At. x47; Rosenberg v.
Retail Clerks' Assn. (1918, Calif. App.) 177 Pac. 864; Barnes v. Typographical
Union (i9o8) 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 94o. In the Barnes Case it is said: "It is
contended that a peaceful picket line around a shop is entirely lawful. But
this court has held otherwise. . . . The very fact of establishing a picket line
is evidence of an intention to annoy, embarrass and intimidate, whether physical
violence is resorted to or not. . . . Any picket line must result in annoyance
both to the employer and the workmen, no matter what is said or done, and to
say that the court is to determine by the degree of annoyance whether it shall
be stopped or not would furnish no guide, but leave the question to the individual
notions or bias of the particular judge." The court in Atchison v. Gee (19o5,
C. C. S. D. Iowa) 139 Fed. 582, states its position very firmly: "There is and
can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste
vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." In Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union (igog) r56 Calif. 70, 3o3 Pac. 324, it is stated that "Many peaceful citizens,
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greater number of the courts is to give the word "picket" the same
meaning which it has in a military sense, namely, stationing a person
to observe certain movements. But some courts hold that it also
means to annoy or prevent the approach of others. This is the view
of those courts that declare it to be illegal per se.6
The generally accepted view is that picketing is not illegal per se, but
that some further accompanying act, illegal in its nature, is necessary
before it will be declared illegal. What is the real distinction between
the two ideas? Both groups agree that theoretically peaceful picket-
ing is legal. But the first group holds that actually there can be no
picketing without intimidation. The second group seems tacitly to
admit that while there may be present a certain measure of intimida-
tion, it is not such as necessarily to make the act illegal. Consequently
each case must stand on its merits and peculiar circumstances, and it
thus becomes a question of fact to be determined by the court as to the
presence of intimidation. 7  Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes
men and women, are always deterred by physical trepidation from entering places
of business so under a boycott patrol It is idle to split hairs upon so plain aproposition, and to say that the picket may consist of nothing more than a singleindividual peacefully endeavoring by persuasion to prevent customers from
entering the boycotted place. The plain facts are always at variance with such
refinements of reason." In the case of St. Germain V. Bakery Union (1937)
97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665, the court held that the intention of picketing was tointimidate: "Whether the picketing was peaceable or otherwise, under the factsin this case, is entirely immaterial, because the sole object of the respondents
was to intimidate, not only the public, but also these appellants [employers],
and force them to enter into a contract which they were unwilling to enter into."
""It will not do to say that these pickets are thrown out for the purpose of
peaceable argument and persuasion. They are intended to intimidate and
coerce. As applied to cases of this character, the lexicographers thus define the
word 'picket': 'A body of men belonging to a trades union sent to watch and
annoy men working in a shop not belonging to the union, or against which a
strike is in progress.' Cent. Dict.; Webst. Dict. The word originally had no
such meaning. This definition is the result of what has been done under it,
and the common application that has been made of it." Beck v. TeamstersProtective Union (1898) ii8 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13, followed in Clarage v.Luphringer (1918) 2oz Mich. 612, 168 N. W. 440. See Jones v. Van Winkle
Machine Works (i9o8) 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236, for discussion as to distinction
between inducement and force.
"Since there can be no strict lines laid down for such a rule, one must agree
with the court in Waddey Co. v. Richmond Union (i9o6) io5 Va. 188, 53 S. E. 273,
when it says: "'Picketing' is one of the methods usually adopted by 'strikers'in furthering their purposes, and here, as in the matter of argument and persua-
tion, they have a right to pursue that method, so long as its use does not become
unlawful." For an excellent discussion of the growth of the law in regard topicketing see Local Union v. Stathakis (i9x8) 135 Ark. 86, 2o5 S. W. 45o.
A good example of the application of this rule is to be found in King v. Weiss& Lesh Mfg. Co. (192o, C. C. A. 6th) 266 Fed. 257, where acts of white strikers,
which would intimidate colored workers, are restrained, even though they would
not have intimidated white men.
COMMENTS
expressly declaring that peaceful picketing is legal, a good indication
of the mores of the times.8
Another weapon employed by A is the inducement, by persuasion or
force, of some unrelated person or group of persons to act so as to
bring pressure to bear on B. This may take different forms, but it
generally resolves itself into what is ordinarily called a boycottY Such
a boycott may have as its aim either one of two things, which we may
term a boycott of labor or a boycott of goods. A may induce C not to
accept employment from B, and the result is a boycott of labor. Or by
inducing C not to work for D, A may compel D to refuse to deal with
B, and we have a boycott of goods. The courts do not agree on the
rights and privileges in cases of this kind, and consequently there are
many conflicting decisions on the point. Originally public opinion
generally condemned the boycott; but gradually this attitude was
modified until at the present time the tendency seems to be thoroughly
to weigh the economic and political interests involved before declaring
such actions illegal. The present rule seems to be, that A may use
persuasion to induce C to take action against B, but any form of intimi-
dation or coercion is unlawful. And of course it is only in the pres-
ence of a trade dispute that such action by A can be lawful, for other-
'These acts merely legalize "peaceful picketing," and since the courts hold
that there can be no such condition in actual life, they are in somewhat of a
quandary and the situation is but little bettered. It is interesting to note the
effort of the court in Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council (1920, Ore.) 192
Pac. 765 to overcome such a situation. It decided that "the legal right peacefully'
to picket is largely dependent upon the purpose and interest, and the method
and manner in which the picketing is done," and then held that the picketing
was illegal because there was no trade dispute. In Monday Co. v. Autonmobile
Workers (1920, Wis.) 177 N. W. 867, the court held that a strike for a closed
shop was not a dispute "concerning terms or conditions of employment" and so
restrained the picketing. In Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc. (592o,
D. C. N. D. Ohio) 263 Fed. 171, it is stated that "This court has repeatedly
in this case disclaimed a judgment that picketing per se was lawful. It was
ordered and allowed in this case as a convenient means of stabilizing a very
uncertain situation. .. "
'The so-called "primary boycott," which is merely the combination of persons
to cease patronizing some other person with whom they are having a dispute
affecting only the two parties involved. There is here practically a perfect
analogy to a justifiable strike. In the one case there is a withholding of
patronage, while in the latter case there is a withholding of labor, both being
to effect the object of the combination. Mr. Justice Van Orsdel in his concurring
opinion in American Federation of Labor v. Buck Stove & Range Co. (i9o9)
33 App. D. C. 83, states the general v'iew on this subject: "I conceive it to be
the privilege of one man, or a number of men, to individually conclude not to
patronize a certain person or corporation. It is also the right of these men to
agree together, and to advise others, not to extend such patronage. . . . To
this point, there is no conspiracy-no boycott. The word 'boycott' is here used
as referring to what is usually understood as the 'secondary boycott'."
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'wise it would simply be a malicious interference in B's business, which
is a violation of a well recognized right.10
THE CRIME OF AIDING A SUICIDE
The criminal guilt to be attached to the abetting of suicide is perhaps
as confusing a question as the law can present; and when the aid
consists merely in furnishing the means of death if desired, a legal
question is presented no less interesting than the ethical problem. In
the recent case of People v. Roberts (1920, Mich.) 178 N. W. 69o, the
wife of the accused was hopelessly ill and had tried to commit suicide.
o"It is not wrong for members of a union to cease patronizing any one when
they regard it for their interest to do so, but they have no right to compel others
to break off business relations with the one from whom they have withdrawn
their patronage, and to do this by unlawful means, with the motive of injuring
such person. Such means as giving notices which excite the fear or reasonable
apprehension of other persons that their business will be injured unless they
do break off such relations or cease patronizing another, are wrong and unlawful."
Wilson v. Hey (19o8) 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928.
"The term 'unfair' as used by organized labor has come to have a meaning
well understood. It means that the person so designated is unfriendly to organ-
ized labor or that he refuses to recognize its rules and regulations. . . . In
Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663 . . . it was said that
whether a publication that an employer of labor is 'unfair' is or is not unlawful
depends on the circumstances of each case, that a notification to customers
that plaintiffs are 'unfair' may portend a threat or intimidation, in which case
it will constitute a boycott and is unlawful, but that a mere notification of that
sort is not a threat, is not unlawful, and that the trial court was in error in
that case in enjoining such conduct. . . . The decision in the Gray Case is
controlling." Steffes v. Motion Picture Operators' Union (1917) 136 Minn. 2oo,
161 N. W. 524. The privilege to boycott is upheld in Empire Theatre Co. v.
Cloke (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. lO7. The court says that "labor unions are
not unlawful in this state; that such unions may publish and pursue a peaceful
boycott against any person or enterprise deemed by them to be unfriendly, and
that a combination of such unions or their members for such purposes cannot
be viewed as a conspiracy. . . . What, then, was the 'threat' conveyed by the
acts of the defendants according to the findings. In the last analysis it was that
all those who patronized the theatre in defiance of the boycott would themselves
be classed as unfriendly and subjected to boycott in their turn, a warning similar
to that conveyed by the Lindsay circular, implicit in the Dilno banner, and
necessarily involved in every earnest boycott. . . . Every person has the
right, singly and in combination with others, to deal or refuse to deal with whom
he chooses; to reach his decision in that, as in all other matters, upon or with-
out good reason; to regard as unfriendly all those who, with or without justifi-
cation, refuse to co-operate or sympathize." Also see Parkinson Co. v. Building
Trades Council (19o8) 154 Calif. 581, 98 Pac. io27. In the federal courts it is
now apparently well settled that a secondary boycott is illegal under the Sherman
Anti-trust Law. Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, affirmed
in (19,5) 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct 17o. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering
(Jan, 3, 1921) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct Term 192o, No. 45, held that the Clayton Act
has made no change in this respect.
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After she had begged her husband to give her poison, he mixed Paris
Green and water in a cup and placed it within her reach. She drank it
and died from the effect of the poison. The husband, confessing his
participation to this extent, was held guilty of murder in the first
degree.
The court attempted partially to avoid the intricacies of the real ques-
tion involved by relying upon a statute defining murder by means of
poison,' for the status of suicide as a crime is apparently unsettled in
Michigan. So that the criminal act charged was not aiding suicide but
administering poison.
The question is not, however, to be so easily dismissed. Intention-
ally to cause another's death by poisoning is unquestionably murder in
every state, and it is difficult to understand why the statute in question
should remove the entire case from consideration in the light of com-
mon-law principles. To abet a suicide2 has been held to be murder
in the first degree,3 murder in the second degree,4 manslaughter,5 or no
crime at all." The accused supplied the immediate means for his wife
to commit suicide, but the act was hers without advice or other encour-
agement from him, and to convict him of administering poison causing
death is to imply a considerable degree of positive and personal partici-
pation on his part hardly warranted by the f acts.7 The wording of the
statute does not make the administering of poison murder in the first
degree; indeed it is only "all murder which shall be perpetrated by
'Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 15192: "All murder which shall be perpetrated
by means of -poison, or lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing . . . shall be deemed murder of the first degree."
' There are apparently four classes of abetting in suicide cases; (a) inciting,
(b) by a suicide pact, (c) by passive aid, and (d) by non-prevention. The
classification of cases according to the degree of criminality does not appear to
correspond to the classes of abetting. The English cases are classified nearly in
this way.
Commonwealth v. Bowen (1816) 13 Mass. 356; Blackburn v. State (1872) 23
Ohio, 146; Reg. v. Alison (838, Cent. Cr. Ct.) 8 Car.& P. 418; Vaux & Rid-
ley's Case (66s, K. B.) Kelyng, 5z; Reg. v. Stormouth (1897) 61 J. P. 729; Reg.
v. Jessop (1887) io CRim. L. MAG. 862; Rex v. Russell (1832, K. B.) i Moody
C. C. 356; State v. Levelle C089) 34 S. C. 120, 13 S. E. 319.
'Commonwealth v. Hicks (9o4) 118 Ky. 637, 82 S. W. 265; State v. Jones
(igw1) 86 S. C. 17, 67 S. E. i6o.
'Commonwealth v. Mink (1877) 123 Mass. 429; People v. Kent (i9o3) 41
Misc. 191, 83 N. Y. Supp. 948; State v. Webb (i9o9) 226 Mo. 378, 115 S. W. 998;
State v. Ludwig (879) 70 Mo. 412.
"Grace v. State (i9oz) 44 Tex. Cr. App. iO1; Saunders v. State (igo8) 54 Tex.
Cr. App. lol. The facts in this latter case are nearly identical with those of the
instant decision.
"See Larremore, Suicide and the Law (19o4) 17 HAxv. L. REv. 332, 337; see
Kenner, Criminal Liability of an Inciter or Abettor of Suicide (1905) 61 CENT.
L. J. 406; Commonwealth v. Bowen, supra note 3, where the jury must have
found the advice was the procuring cause of the suicide's death in order to con-
vict the accused.
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means of poison," and thus the instant case assumes that murder has
been committed and that as the means used was poison, it is murder in
the first degree.
But does this not beg the whole question? Can the fundamental
problem be solved without facing the issue of what crime suicide is
and what criminal responsibility attaches to aiding its consummation?
At common law suicide was undoubtedly self-murder." To force
another to kill himself was murder on the part of the compeller, and
the doctrine was extended to include suicide due to persuasion, advice,
or mutual agreement.9 But if the abettor were not present at the act
which caused the death, then he would be an accessory before the fact
and escape punishment, for he could not be tried until the principal was
first tried and convicted.' 0 The effect of this rule has been avoided,
however, by treating the accessory as the principal, whether present or
not, on the theory that the act causing death was his act." Abetting a
suicide is then murder.
S i Hale P. C. 411-417; 2 id. 62; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 95, i89, 19o;
Hales v. Petit (1563, Q. B.) i Plowd. 25-3 (where the opinion of Brown, J.,
apparently suggested to Shakespeare the grave-diggers' argument about suicide
in Hamlet); Rex v. Dyson (1823, K. B.) Rus. & Ry. 523; Commonwealth v.
Mink, supra note 5; see (1914) 49 LAw J. 95; (1891) 55 J. P. 115; Mikell, Is
Suicide Murder (1903) 3 Coi. L. REv. 379, where the subject is very ably
reviewed. But American jurisdictions are at complete variance on the subject.
For instance, to attempt suicide is a felony, but to succeed no crime at all. Dar-
row v. Family Fund Soc. (1889) 1x6 N. Y. 542, 22 N. E. 1093; contra, May v.
Pennell (igo6) IOI Me. 516, 64 Adt. 885. Suicide is not a crime in Illinois.
Royal Circle v. Acherrath (19o3) 204 Il. 549, 68 N. E. 492. See 8 R C. L. 351,
where it is suggested that suicide can not be a crime in the United States because
of its entailing at common law a forfeiture of goods and a degrading burial.
But suicide is probably a malum in se and the nature of its penalty does not
change the nature of the offense.
'See Kenner, op. cit. note 7; see 66 L. R. A. 304 for collected cases in point;
see i Wharton, Criminal Law (Ilth ed. 1912) 744.
"Reg. v. Leddington (1839, Q. B.) 9 Car. & P. 79; Re.r. v. Russell, supra note3; see Kenner, op. cit. note 7. The point is discussed in nearly every case of
abetting suicide. By statutes in England and several American jurisdictions,
advising another to commit suicide is made a substantive indictable offense. See
N. Y. Penal Code, 1882, sec. 175; Ark. Rev. St. ch. 44, div. 3, art. 2, sec. 4; Calif.
Penal Code, sec. 4oo; Minn. Comp. Laws, ch. 94, sec. 14; Kan. Comp. Laws,
ch. 31, sec. 13, 326; see Blackburn v. State, supra note 3. It does not appear in
the instant case whether the accused was present or absent when his wife drank
the poison.
'Blackburn v. State, supra note 3. The abolition of the distinction between
aiders and accessories in some jurisdictions has made such a party guilty of mur-
der for advising a suicide, whether absent or present at the time of the act, pro-
vided the suicide is the result of his advice. Commonwealth v Hicks, supra
note 4; see 37 Cyc. 521. Such a statute existed in Michigan, although the
instant case makes no mention of it. Mich. Comp. Laws, 1857, sec. 9545. It
will be noticed, of course, that for the statute to apply, a felony must of necessity
have been committed. It is also important to decide whether the act of the
suicide is the act of the abettor, or the act of the abettor the act of the suicide.
As here, for instance, one might be a crime, but the other no crime at all.
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But thus to hold the abettor as principal must not blind us to the
important and logical difference between in act and its consequences 
;,1
for having decided the status of suicide, it would be easy to stretch the
"principal's" participation to absurd extremes. Thus the instant case
either holds that the "act" of swallowing the poison was the "act" of
the accused, 13 or that a close causal connection existed between his act
of furnishing the poison and his wife's act of drinking it.
14  Furnish-
ing an instrument to a criminal, if one knows a crime will be committed
with it, is perhaps a criminal offence. But unless the "act" contem-
plated is criminal, what crime has been committed in furnishing the
instrument? Or how can the accessory-principal be guilty of a crime
when the actual principal is guilty of none, both having done the same
"act" ?
In any light the instant case has stretched the doctrine of the abet-
tor's guilt to an extraordinary length, and beyond any of its prece-
dents.1 5 The court based its decision upon a statute, but its authori-
"See Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law (1917) 26 YALE
LAw JouRNAL, 645; the writer makes a careful analysis of the word "act" as
defined by the courts and text-writers, and argues forcefully and convincingly
for a restriction in the breadth of its meaning. Thus, the word "act" as used
by the courts in the present connection, must mean to include its consequences,
and that no logical distinction can be made between the act of killing a man and
the act of doing something which results (however remotely) in his death. See
Salmond, Jurisprudence (16th ed. 192o) 327. If we mean by an act a muscular
movement that is willed, the theory of holding the accessory as a principal is
wholly untenable; but in reliance on the usual elastic meaning of the word
convictions are being secured when by exact analysis their lack of legal founda-
tion would be disclosed.
' See Withers, Status of Suicide as a Crime (1914) 1g VA. L. REv. 641, 645;
Burnett v. People (19o3) 2o4 I1. 2o8, 68 N. F_. 505: "The act of the principal is
the act of the accessory" and "it becomes immaterial what was the character
of the crime committed by the principal or whether there was any crime," for
the principal is dead. The instant case cites this decision as authority and its
reasoning is exactly analogous although not so explicit. Thus whether suicide
is a crime or not is "immaterial" It is sufficient that "administering" poison is
murder. By the court's own reasoning one is led to the conclusion that suicide
must be murder; for how else does the statute apply? The "act" of the wife
in administering poison to herself was the "act" of the accused; if this was not
murder, how can he be held guilty?
" See (igog) 12 LAw NOTES, 163, where facts similar to those in the instant
case are supposed and the present result questioned: "In order for one who
incites to suicide to be guilty of murder, a causal connection must exist between
the incitement and the suicide." See State v. Jones, supra note 4, for a dis-
cussion of the necessity of causal connection.
" See Larremore, op. cit. note 7: "It is doubtful whether the doctrine . . .
could be stretched to cover instances where the project of suicide originated with
the suicide himself, and the abettor went no further than to encourage and
assist" The present decision is based for the most part on Blackburn v. State,
supra note 3, where there was strong evidence of coercion. But the Ohio court
said "It is immaterial whether the party taking the poison took it willingly, intend-
ing to commit suicide, or was overcome by force, or overreached by fraud," and
the words of that decision are in perfect accord with the holding in the instant
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ties, analogy, and reasoning are those of a steady development
in the law of suicide. To call it "homicide" and entirely disregard
the wilful, independent, intervening suicide of the other party is to
ignore the main factor in the case. The result in such a decision maybe eminently just and merited, but it is not the sole consideration; the
court's reasoning is of material importance, particularly in such a com-
paratively uncharted phase of the law as suicide, where every decision
is likely to mark a definite step.
The incurable suffering of the suicide, as a legal question, couldhardly affect the degree of criminality, although perhaps it might pal-
liate the atrocity of the crime from a moral point of view. The life
of those to whom life has become a burden is as much to be protectedby law as the life of those in its full tide and enjoyment; if discrim-
inations are to be made as to the amount of punishment due, they must
be made by executive clemency or legislative provision.6
If one is caught at a distillery, which is ready for operation, does
this give rise to the presumption that he operated it? In Barton v.United States (192o, C. C. A. 4th) 267 Fed. 174, the court held that the
possession of the still would justify the inference that the possession
is a guilty possession, as in the case of stolen goods, that the proximity
of the accused to the place may by a reasonable inference raise the
presumption of possession, and that it consequently becomes incumbent
upon the accused to give some explanation of his presence there. Itis entirely probable that the portion of the charge of the trial court,
which is made the basis for this pronouncement by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, was well within the rule which permits the court to comment
upon the evidence and to state his opinion thereon. But the appellate
court seems to confuse the difference between an inference of fact and
a presumption of law. Proximity to the place where the still is situated
may be a circumstance from which the jury may infer possession-it
is a permissible inference, but it cannot be regarded as a necessary
inference which puts the burden of going forward on the accused.
Presumptions of fact are derived wholly by means of the common
experience of mankind, from the course of nature, and the ordinary
habits of society." To hold, in view of this, that proximity to a place
where an illicit article is stored gives rise to the presumption of itspossession, seems erroneous. Unless the court is establishing a new
presumption of law based on policy and convenience, it would seem
that the holding in the principal case can not be supported.
case. In the result, however, if not in the doctrine stated, the present decisionis more extreme than any other of its kind. See (ig2o) i9 MicH. L. REv. 98." See Blackburn v. State, supra note 3; see (192o) 7 VA. L. REv. z47.
'Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (898) 549.
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The Supreme Court has again refused to uphold the fiction of the
corporate entity where the corporation is a mere agent and instru-
mentality for the violation of the law. United States v. Lehigh Val-
ley Ry. (1920, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 104. Some years ago the Lehigh
Valley Railroad and its subsidiary, the Lehigh Valley Coal Com-
pany, organized the Lehigh Valley Sales Company, the share-holders
of which were identical with those of the railroad. The Sales Com-
pany then contracted with the Coal Company to purchase all of its coal
and not to purchase from anyone else, thus making the Sales Company
an agency to evade the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act.
Following its decision and reasoning in the case of United States v.
Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Ry.,' the court held that the pur-
chase of the coal by the Sales Company was merely a device to evade
the law, and that the contract was therefore void. As the law now
stands, it is doubtful whether mere identity of stock ownership in the
absence of a contract would have been sufficient to bring the case within
the Commodities Clause. The next logical step in "piercing the veil of
corporate entity" would seem to be to construe this identity of stock-
holders as giving the corporation a legal or equitable interest in the
commodity.
In Hutchins v. Maunder (192o, K. B.) 37 T. L. R. 72, it was held
that putting an automobile with a worn steering gear on the highway
was in itself negligence on the part of the owner, although the failure
to discover the defect was not negligent;' or, as the counsel for the
plaintiff said, it was placing on the public highway a "wild beast" and
not a "domesticated animal." Hence it would seem that 'in England
motor cars are potential ferae naturae. Each "Henry" or "Rolls" may
go wild at any moment.2 Car owners may find themselves in possession
of a "wild beastie."3  Fortunately this dual personality is not recog-
nised in this country, and automobiles are still ferae domesticae,4
though those who indulge in breeding them are liable for any bad habits
acquired while they are being raised.
5
' (1915) 238 U. S. S16, 35 Sup. Ct. 873.
'The car had just been purchased second hand, and was being driven by the
engineer who recommended the purchase.
'The breed in this case was "Rover."
'See discussion in Guzzi v. New York Zoological Soc. (I92o, App. Div.) 182
N. Y. Supp. 257; see II L. R. A. (r. s.) 748, note.
'See Allen v. Schultz (i929) IO7 Wash. 393, I8i Pac. 916 (held to be negligence
not to have brakes in order). But see King v. Sinythe (I918) 24o Tenn. 217, 204
S. W. 296 (held, that an automobile was not such a "dangerous agency" as to
make the owner "liable ... irrespective of relationship of master and servant").
Also see Landry v. Oversen (2929, Iowa) 174 N. W. 255 (held, that an automo-
bile is not per se a dangerous agency).
" See Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co. (2929, C. C. A. 2d) 261 Fed. 878 (held,
that an automobile manufacturer was liable for damages caused by the breaking
off of a defective wheel). See 37 L R. A. (N. s.) 56o, note.
